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Abstract
Background: Mass gatherings have been defined by the World Health Organisation as "events
attended by a sufficient number of people to strain the planning and response resources of a
community, state or nation". This paper explores the public health response to mass gatherings in
Sydney, the factors that influenced the extent of deployment of resources and the utility of planning
for mass gatherings as a preparedness exercise for other health emergencies.
Discussion:  Not all mass gatherings of people require enhanced surveillance and additional
response. The main drivers of extensive public health planning for mass gatherings reflect
geographical spread, number of international visitors, event duration and political and religious
considerations. In these instances, the implementation of a formal risk assessment prior to the
event with ongoing daily review is important in identifying public health hazards.
Developing and utilising event-specific surveillance to provide early-warning systems that address
the specific risks identified through the risk assessment process are essential. The extent to which
additional resources are required will vary and depend on the current level of surveillance
infrastructure.
Planning the public health response is the third step in preparing for mass gatherings. If the existing
public health workforce has been regularly trained in emergency response procedures then far less
effort and resources will be needed to prepare for each mass gathering event. The use of formal
emergency management structures and co-location of surveillance and planning operational teams
during events facilitates timely communication and action.
Summary: One-off mass gathering events can provide a catalyst for innovation and engagement
and result in opportunities for ongoing public health planning, training and surveillance
enhancements that outlasted each event.
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Background
Mass gatherings have been defined by the World Health
Organisation [1] as "events attended by a sufficient
number of people to strain the planning and response
resources of a community, state or nation". There is grow-
ing recognition of the public health implications of mass
gatherings [1] with evidence of associated injuries [2-5],
heat related illness [6,7], illicit drug-related adverse events
[8], violence [9-11] and global outbreaks of infectious dis-
eases [12,13].
For the purposes of this article the authors have focused
the debate on those mass gatherings that are deemed non-
emergency incidents, such as religious or sporting events,
where there is usually sufficient time for planning.
One challenge facing host cities and nations is the extent
to which public health practitioners should change or
increase their current activities to respond to what is often
a short term event with little, if any, resource enhance-
ments.
Over the past decade, Sydney, the capital city of New
South Wales (NSW), Australia, has hosted several organ-
ised mass gatherings, of both international and local
importance, that meet the WHO definition. The NSW
Health Department and associated Area Health Services
(which together comprise "NSW Health") decided to
address these challenges by enhancing public health sur-
veillance and response capabilities for these events.
This paper explores the evolving nature of the public
health response to organised mass gatherings in Sydney
including the factors that influenced the deployment of
resources and provides a rationale for the utility of public
health planning for mass gatherings as a preparedness
exercise and the building of a legacy. It is important to
note that public health is only one part of an integrated
whole-of-government response to preparing for mass
gatherings.
Discussion
When does a 'mass gathering' require enhanced public 
health planning and response?
Sydney has an international reputation as a "party city
[14]" and hosts mass gatherings of over 200,000 people at
least semi-annually (including Sydney's New Year's Eve
and Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras celebrations [15]). Since
2000 the city has also hosted a number of significant
international events including the Sydney Olympic and
Paralympic Games in 2000 [16], the Rugby World Cup in
2003 [17], the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Leaders Week in 2007, and World Youth Day in 2008
(WYD'08) [18].
Despite its "party city" reputation, only certain mass gath-
ering events in Sydney are subject to lengthy pre-event
public health planning and consequent large-scale mobi-
lisation of public health resources.
Table 1 describes some of the features of the mass gather-
ings held in Sydney over the past decade where NSW
Health determined that specific public health attention
was required. The common characteristics of these mass
gatherings were:
▪ the duration of the gathering (at least several days),
▪ the number of international visitors, and
▪ the geographical extent (with events being held in
multiple locations across the city or sometimes across
the whole State).
In contrast, the annual Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras
parade and New Year's Eve celebrations are short-lived
events, lasting less than 48 hours. For these events the
public health action focuses on health promotion activi-
ties such as safer-sex or party-safe messages and on moni-
toring trends in communicable disease and the detection
of environmental hazards through routine syndromic sur-
veillance [19] and mandatory notification of selected
communicable diseases.
Another factor influencing the decision to enhance activi-
ties is the political or religious dimensions of some events.
An international high profile has the potential to increase
the risk of a terrorist attack, due to the increased global
attention on one city for a short time [1]. For this reason,
the APEC Leaders' Week has been included in this paper
as a special type of "mass gathering": although the numer-
ical size of the international contingent was relatively
small (around 5,000) and the event was not geographi-
cally dispersed, the risk profile of participants (heads of
state of 21 member economies, including the Presidents
of China, Indonesia, Russia and the United States of
America) increased the possibility of a terrorist attack or
public disorder (as seen with G20 riots in Melbourne,
2006 [9] and London, 2009 [10] and at a number of G8
fora across the world [11]). As a result, the threats to the
health of participants, summit support staff (including a
large emergency services presence) and people living and
working in central Sydney were considered.
Other political dimensions of mass gatherings that influ-
ence decisions to temporarily enhance public health capa-
bilities relate to their profile and the need for
governments to address community perceptions about
the impact on the city and, conversely, the opportunity toBMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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maximise favourable local and international media atten-
tion.
Preparing for organised mass gatherings, however, does
come at a financial and opportunity cost and the impact
is highly dependent on the current level of investment in
public health infrastructure and the size of the mass gath-
ering. Additional budgets enhancements are often not
forthcoming, are negligible compared to the size of the
event, or insufficient to meet the expectations of event
organisers or government officials. The ability for smaller
jurisdictions to meet unrealistic expectations can have a
negative effect on the existing workforce and could result
in the de-motivation of staff and a rapid exhaustion of
resources. In such situations the state of preparedness
needs to be commensurate with the level of risk identified
through the risk assessment and a resource prioritisation
process. Preparation and response also does not need to
be expensive. Many of the activities described below were
achieved with only a modest budget.
Enhanced risk assessment
In Sydney, the planning process starts with a pre-event
health risk assessment, conducted up to two years before
the event [11]. Importantly, initial risk assessments were
periodically reviewed in the lead up to events and regular
review occurred during the event as part of the daily activ-
ities of the centralised planning teams. These risk assess-
ments are performed with input from other government
agencies, such as the event organising committee, intelli-
gence services and police - so as to co-ordinate the level of
preparedness across agencies.
Table 1: A description of mass gatherings in Sydney
Event Year Type of 
event
Venues/geographic 
spread
Duration 
of event 
(days)
Estimated 
age range 
of visitors
Size of gathering: 
Estimated numbers of 
visitors
Special Features
Internati
onal
Domestic
Summer 
Olympics [32]
2000 Sport Sydney metropolitan 17 All 110,000 362,000 ▪ >5 million tickets 
sold,
▪ 47,000 volunteers,
▪ >10,000 athletes 
from 199 nations,
▪ 28 sports, 300 
events.
Paralympics [32] 2000 Sport Sydney metropolitan 12 All Unknown Unknown ▪ >1 million tickets 
sold,
▪ 4,000 athletes from 
122 nations,
▪ 18 sports.
Rugby World 
Cup [33]
2003 Sport 11 venues in 10 cities 
Australia-wide. Semi-
finals and final in 
Sydney
44 All 65,000 49,948 
(interstate 
visitors)
▪ National event
▪ 1.8 million 
spectators
▪ 20 teams, 48 
matches.
▪ Majority of visitors 
from UK and Europe.
Asia Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
(APEC) forum 
[34]
2007 Political Sydney CBD 8 (main 
Sydney 
program)
Adult >7,000 Unknown ▪ Included meeting of 
leaders of 21 member 
economies
▪ Low visitor 
numbers but high 
security risk.
World Youth Day 
[35]
2008 Religious Mainly Sydney 
metropolitan area + 
pre-event activities 
throughout Australia
6 (main 
event 
period).
Targeted at 
15-35 year-
olds
110,000 
registered
113,000 
registered
▪ 70,000 people 
involved in pre-event 
activities in all regions 
of Australia.
▪ > 500,000 people 
attended individual 
events from >170 
nations.BMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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For each event, health risk assessments were made by an
expert group using variations of a standard risk assess-
ment methodology [1,21,22], that is: establishing the
context; identifying the risks; analysing the risks; evaluat-
ing the risks and considering the likelihood of the inci-
dent occurring and the extent of its impact on human
health.
Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of the potentially sig-
nificant risks identified in the pre-event period for each of
the mass gatherings. Greater emphasis was placed on
those risks potentially amenable to action or intervention.
The assessment process included analysis of:
▪ the type of event, including duration and geographi-
cal spread of events;
▪ projected crowd densities at venues, on public trans-
port and at accommodation sites;
▪ the characteristics of the participants, including age
and expected vaccination coverage;
▪ seasonal patterns of communicable disease in NSW,
Australia and in the home nations of visitors;
▪ prevalence of temporary food vending and the qual-
ity of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) plans;
▪ existing environmental hazards in the city
▪ transient environmental hazards, particularly porta-
ble or temporary toilet facilities at venues and mass
accommodation sites, such as school halls, and the
adequacy of hand washing facilities associated with
these;
▪ access to medical facilities at venues or mass accom-
modation sites; and
▪ known existing security alerts.
Public health planning for each of the events also built on
the experience gained from previous mass gatherings and
benefited from direct access to both local public health
practitioners involved in those events and to the formal
documentation. However, even though NSW Health has
played a major role in the planning and operations of five
large mass gatherings within an eight year period, knowl-
edge transfer from previous event public health teams to
the next did not always occur smoothly or completely, pri-
Table 2: Pre-event summary risk profile of mass gatherings in Sydney: Communicable diseases
Event Year Home nations of 
visitors
Main 
accommodation 
type
Season event held New or existing 
communicable 
disease risk 
population and 
environmental 
risks (examples)
Pre-event risk 
level
Summer Olympics 
[32]
2000 Multinational Hotel
Athletes village
Spring ▪ Late influenza 
season
▪ Temporary food 
vendors
▪ Crowding
▪ Recent local 
Legionella
▪ Cryptosporidium 
detected in the cities 
drinking water
▪ Circulating measles 
in visitor home 
nations
Low
Paralympics [32] 2000 Multinational Hotel
Athletes village
Spring ▪ Temporary food 
vendors
▪ Crowding
Low
Rugby World Cup 
[33]
2003 Mainly UK & Europe Hotel Spring Low
Asia Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) 
forum [34]
2007 Pacific Rim Secure hotel Spring Low
World Youth Day 
[35]
2008 Multinational, many 
from developing 
nations.
School halls/billeted/
communal sleep-out 
at final event
Winter ▪ Influenza season
▪ Crowding
ModerateBMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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marily due to changes in the personnel involved at each
event. Thus, archiving of documentation and operational
reports from previous events is important, as is the capture
and storage, in written, searchable form, of the findings of
event "post mortem" and similar debriefing activities. The
inclusion of senior public health personnel with past
mass gathering planning experience on relevant commit-
tees and working groups is also recommended.
The remainder of this article discusses the type of response
required once the decision has been made to enhance
public health planning, surveillance and response.
Should host cities increase public health surveillance?
For all types of mass gathering, routine surveillance of
communicable disease trends and environmental hazards
should be maintained. However, to supplement these
routine systems it is important to develop and deploy
event-specific public health surveillance systems to pro-
vide earlier and/or more sensitive warning for specific
risks identified through the risk assessment process. This
section describes the development and refinement of spe-
cial-purpose public health surveillance systems in Sydney
and demonstrates the benefits to the host city in doing so.
For the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000, provisional syn-
dromic surveillance systems were implemented in
selected Emergency Departments [23], venue medical
clinics [24], and cruise ships used as floating hotels for a
six week period [25,26]. These surveillance systems
focussed on issues of public health significance, including
infectious diseases and injury. To monitor environmental
and food safety hazards at Olympic venues a simple
standardised reporting tool of the number and outcome
of inspections was developed.
Syndromic surveillance during the Sydney Olympics was
assessed by NSW Health to have been useful from a public
health and political perspective. Therefore, for the Rugby
World Cup in 2003, a new, highly automated Emergency
Department syndromic surveillance system using rou-
tinely collected data was developed and deployed. This
system continues today. Information collected includes
demographic, arrival and disposition information, as well
as triage notes that include important descriptive informa-
tion about the nature of the presentation. Automated
reports, updated every four hours, highlight unusual
short-term trends in conditions of potential public health
concern, including infectious disease syndromes, injury
and adverse events associated with alcohol or illicit drugs
[8,19]. Because this system repurposes and adds value to
data which would be collected anyway, and due to its high
degree of automation, it has been feasible to operate this
system on a continuous basis since its inception, and to
gradually expand its geographical scope. Comparative
"baseline" data is essential for the successful interpreta-
tion of non-specific syndromic surveillance data.
During APEC Leaders' Week, dedicated medical clinics
were opened for the delegates and their support staff. A set
Table 3: Pre-event summary risk profile of mass gatherings in Sydney: non-Communicable diseases
Event Year Injury risk among 
visitors and spectators
Pre-event risk level Risk of terrorist attack Pre-event risk level
Summer Olympics [32] 2000 ▪ Mass gatherings at 
multiple sporting venues, 
including temporary 
buildings
▪ Mass gatherings and 
alcohol consumption at 
entertainment sites
Moderate Bombing at previous 
Olympics in Atlanta [36]
Low-Biological
Moderate-conventional
Paralympics [32] 2000 ▪ Mass gatherings at single 
sporting venue
Low No previous history of 
attack
Low
Rugby World Cup [33] 2003 ▪ Multiple gatherings at 
various sporting venues
Low First large, extended 
international mass gathering 
in Sydney post-11 
September 2001
Low
Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) 
forum [34]
2007 ▪ Smaller numbers in 
localised area
Low Leaders of 21 member 
economies
Presidents of China, Russia 
and the United States of 
America
Moderate/High, 
biological and/or
conventional
World Youth Day [35] 2008 ▪ Mass gatherings at 
multiple venues, including 
temporary buildings
▪ Large pilgrimage walk 
through city streets
Moderate No previous history of 
attack
LowBMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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of syndromes of potential public health importance was
developed and clinic staff were requested to notify public
health personnel of any persons presenting with those
syndromes. A post-event audit showed that some presen-
tations that should have been notified to public health
authorities were not, particularly 'influenza-like illness'.
Thus, it is important to embed public health surveillance
personnel within clinical teams in such temporary medi-
cal facilities. During APEC, the pre-existing public health
near real-time Emergency Department surveillance system
was also utilised to monitor event-related presentations to
Sydney public hospitals. Twice daily, the ED surveillance
database was searched for the keyword ("APEC") and
details of these presentations were reviewed by public
health staff for possible public health significance.
By the time WYD'08 was held in Sydney, the emergency
department syndromic surveillance system had been
operational for five years, during which time good base-
line data as well as a wealth of experience in the interpre-
tation of the often non-specific syndrome count data had
been accumulated. For WYD'08, an hourly feed of ambu-
lance emergency call data for the Sydney region was estab-
lished to complement ED data feeds. The ambulance data
was automatically analysed and reported. Prior to the
event, ED staff were requested to flag presentations by pil-
grims by entering the key words 'WYD' or 'pilgrim' in their
routine free text recorded at patient triage. This provided
valuable, timely and relatively pilgrim-specific syndromic
information of public health importance at very little cost.
Summary results of this enhanced ED surveillance are pro-
vided in Figure 1.
Many of the pilgrims attending WYD'08 were accommo-
dated in groups of twenty to eighty, in school halls, some
with limited toilet and ablution facilities, or in large, cov-
ered sporting arenas where temporary sanitation facilities
were installed for the event. The Health Access Co-ordina-
tion Unit (HAC), operated by the Ambulance Service of
NSW, agreed to take health-related calls from WYD'08
accommodation supervisors and to provide basic health
advice or to organise dispatch of an ambulance to the
Emergency Department enhanced 'real-time' surveillance during World Youth Day 2008# Sydney, using keyword searches on  triage text by allocated syndrome and date of presentation* Figure 1
Emergency Department enhanced 'real-time' surveillance during World Youth Day 2008# Sydney, using key-
word searches on triage text by allocated syndrome and date of presentation*. #WYD surveillance period was con-
ducted over an extended period from 7th July 2008 till 24th July 2008. * Search terms covered the locations of the mass 
gatherings and relevant words such as "WYD", "WORLD", "PILG", "DIOCESE", "CROWD", "PAPAL", "POPE", and "CATHO-
LIC".
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accommodation, if the situation warranted. The HAC
team notified the public health emergency operations
centre of reports of syndromes of particular concern, such
as influenza-like-illness, occurring amongst pilgrims stay-
ing in shared accommodation. These notifications led to
the timely identification of a number of outbreaks of
influenza18 and gastroenteritis. Although it was a particu-
larly sensitive system, like most syndromic surveillance
systems, it was not especially specific, and response
thresholds needed to be adjusted during the event as the
resources required to investigate all potential outbreaks
were depleted.
In addition, for WYD'08 NetEpi [27] an internet based
public health outbreak management program was used by
Public Health Units and an electronic "bedboard" system
was developed and deployed at venue medical clinics.
This bedboard system enabled both clinic staff and Emer-
gency Operations Centre staff to monitor bed utilisation
and waiting times in several of these temporary facilities,
simultaneously and in near real-time, as well as allowing
clinic staff to easily flag patient presentations of potential
public health significance. Details of these flagged presen-
tations were automatically forwarded to a separate data-
base using the Internet. Public health personnel could
then evaluate and follow-up individual cases and produce
trend and other aggregate statistics.
The sophistication and effectiveness of public health sur-
veillance has improved with each mass gathering in Syd-
ney, building on the experience gained during previous
events and benefitting from technological development
and operational refinement of the state's disease surveil-
lance infrastructure. With pre-existing, routine syndromic
and notifiable communicable disease surveillance sys-
tems in place, only modest resources were required to
make the necessary enhancements to ensure early warning
system during mass gatherings. Because many surveil-
lance developments used information recorded for other
purposes within the NSW health system, these events have
provided a tangible milestone and reason for engagement
of clinical and information technology personnel who
have to put aside other priorities to contribute to the
development of surveillance systems.
What level of public health response?
This section focuses on pre-event planning and training
for response capabilities to potential threats to public
health posed by, or heightened by, mass gatherings and
the utility of these plans for ongoing public health activi-
ties.
The extent of the public health response should be deter-
mined by the outcome of the risk assessment, level of
available and resources and integration of response by
affected sectors.
Over time the level of coordination between response sec-
tors to mass gatherings has strengthened in NSW. An inci-
dent control system is now fully operational that
enhances communication and reduces duplication of
effort between Agencies. In this system of command and
control Agencies are assigned a lead role dependent on the
nature of the incident or event. Strong partnerships with
organising Agencies are critical and provide public health
officials with access to sites and to medical centres located
in venues. In the event of an emergency response during
the event, the state's Disaster Plan [28] may be enacted -
this plan clearly identifies the roles and responsibilities of
each responding agency.
At the time of the Sydney Olympic Games, NSW had a
well developed public health network across the state,
comprising 17 public health units (PHU), each staffed by
between ten and twenty public health practitioners,
including public health physicians and nurses, environ-
mental health officers and food inspectors. The network
was supported by a central office function based in the
Department of Health in Sydney. The PHU teams had
extensive experience in dealing with communicable dis-
ease outbreaks and environmental hazards. At that time,
however, the PHU teams had very little training in emer-
gency management, and only limited experience in co-
ordinated response across regional boundaries and with
other response Agencies.
To ensure unimpeded access to and clear delineation of
responsibility for Olympic Games venues, a temporary
change to the Public Health Act 1991 (NSW) was gazetted
which established a special-purpose 'Olympic Public
Health Team', to which public health staff from the rural
regions of NSW not affected by the Games were temporar-
ily transferred. The size of the public health team re-
deployed from rural areas was kept to a minimum to
reduce any impact on routine public health services in the
rural areas. The rural areas also re-focussed their work
towards the most acute conditions during the period of
the Games leaving a back-log of work.
Training on "Olympic-specific" response protocols and
the process for implementing public health surge capacity
was provided to relevant PHU personnel across the State.
Also, given new surveillance systems had been established
in Emergency Departments extensive training over a
period of one year was provided to officers to ensure data
quality and timeliness. Training can result in significant
costs that include venue hire, catering, travel and salary
costs for up to 60 people.BMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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During the event a Health Olympic Coordinating Centre
(HOCC) was established [20,29]. This co-located all the
public health teams engaged in monitoring surveillance
and response planning. Co-location was found to be an
important means of keeping the teams informed of the
latest intelligence and maintaining swift and reliable lines
of communication. The HOCC reported directly to a
whole-of-government Emergency Operations Centre lead
by the Police department and also the International
Olympic Committee.
The Sydney 2007 APEC event occurred in a world with
heightened security concerns, post the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks in the United States. In this environment, the
need for key public health staff to hold appropriate
national security clearances so as to be adequately briefed
on the risk of bioterrorism or other attacks became appar-
ent at inter-agency planning meetings.
By the time the WYD'08 event occurred most PHU teams
in NSW had been trained in emergency management and
had a greater level of understanding of the command,
control and coordination structure described in the NSW
Health disaster plan (HealthPlan) and in the NSW Interim
Influenza Pandemic Action Plan [30]. The SARS epidemic,
the establishment of highly pathogenic strains of avian
influenza in animal populations in neighbouring coun-
tries, and concomitant increasing concerns about pan-
demic influenza had also motivated significant
enhancement of resources in the field, including the
establishment of a dedicated public health emergency
management unit within the head office of the NSW
Department of Health, and the conduct of regular field
exercises, some on a substantial scale.
Ensuring a legacy for public health
There are a number of challenges facing cities or nations
which are required to respond to the public health needs
of mass gathering events. Often the extent of public health
preparation for a mass gathering event is driven by politi-
cal rather than public health imperatives [1]. With any
one-off mass gathering it is also possible that, following
the event, any public health developments will not be
integrated into routine practice and the valuable experi-
ence will be lost as the teams established for the events are
dissolved, resulting in the loss of "corporate memory",
which can be exacerbated by the failure to archive docu-
ments.
Conversely, augmentation of public health surveillance
and workforce infrastructure and coordination mecha-
nisms put in place for a mass gathering often persist after
the event, and thus provide ongoing benefit and should
be designed with this goal in mind. Public health func-
tions during mass gatherings are also often provided with
only modest short-term budget enhancements, however,
these additional funds can sometimes be used to address
both the immediate needs for the mass gathering as well
as meeting longer-term requirements that would not oth-
erwise have been addressed [31].
In the case of Sydney, the regular hosting of mass gather-
ings has benefited public health surveillance and
response, leaving a quantifiable impact. NSW Health has
been able to develop and deploy near real-time syndromic
emergency department and ambulance data surveillance
infrastructure on an ongoing basis, which it would not
otherwise have had. Each event is now formally docu-
mented and evaluated; leaving a document trail and
resources for future gatherings.
An incremental enhancement in the skills and knowledge
of the NSW public health workforce has enabled
improved coordination of effort, using structured and
standardised mechanisms.
During the current response to the pandemic (H1N1)
2009 the previous experience of mass gatherings in Syd-
ney has enabled NSW Health to quickly implement a for-
mal incident control system, establish a state-wide Public
Health Emergency Operations Centre within 24 hours
and utilised the near-real time surveillance system to pro-
vide daily reports, seven days a week, on Emergency
Department activity for influenza-like-illness. The logis-
tics of supplying equipment such as radio transmitters,
laptops, wireless internet access cards and mobile phones
originally acquired for World Youth Day 2008 ensured
the rapid and easy deployment of public health teams to
external sites and efficient communication between sec-
tors of government. Experience in conducting mobile
influenza clinics during World Youth Day also informed
the development of mobile influenza clinics during the
pandemic.
In between mass gatherings, formal training programs for
the public health workforce in emergency management,
experience in field exercises and involvement in smaller
events or events with less high profile has enhanced the
workforce awareness and competence in NSW. Whilst
finding adequate funding for such investments can be
challenging, the long term preparedness and response
benefit for future mass gatherings or large scale public
health emergencies, such as pandemic influenza, could
offer a large return on investment to the city, state or
nation.
Summary
▪ Not all mass gatherings of people require additional
public health planning.BMC Public Health 2009, 9:324 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/324
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▪ The main drivers of enhanced public health planning for
mass gatherings reflect the extent of geographical spread,
number of international visitors, event duration and
political and religious considerations.
▪ The extent to which additional resources are required
will vary and depend on: previously acquired expertise
and experience, the current level of surveillance infrastruc-
ture, workforce capacity and existing emergency manage-
ment structures.
▪ One-off mass gathering events provide a catalyst for
innovation and engagement and can provide an opportu-
nity for ongoing public health planning, training and sur-
veillance enhancements that outlast the event.
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